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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/04/2006 Accident number: 299 
Accident time: 07:50 Accident Date: 04/08/2000 
Where it occurred: Ploughshare Minefield, 
Mozambique border 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 04/08/2000 
ID original source: JM Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:Z06
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: M969 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
 
Accident report 
The following official “accident summary” was made available in January 2001. No other 
report was made. The summary was compiled by the demining group’s site manager on the 
day following the accident. For obscure reasons, the country manager of the programme 
edited/censored the content of the following before making it available. 
The text has been edited where necessary to conceal the identity of individuals and 
organisations mentioned by the researcher. 
1 
At 07:50 on 04 Aug 2000, Deminer [name withheld by demining group] detonated a mine 
whilst conducting clearance in the Ploughshare Minefield at UTM 0331525 8209341.  
At the time of the accident the Operations Manager and Project Doctor were located at the 
Operations Base. 
I learnt of the occurrence over the radio. I then suspended operations on the other sites. 
Further information indicated that a deminer had stood on a mine and had lost his right foot. 
Dr Chitsama immediately left Operations for the affected site and contacted headquarters in 
Harare to place MARS (Medical Air Rescue Service) on standby for a possible air-evacuation 
from Mukumbura airstrip. The casualty was treated on site and stabilised by the paramedics. 
Dr Chitsama decided that the casualty would best be air evacuated to Harare by MARS. 
MARS was contacted again and requested to uplift the casualty from Mukumbura airstrip. 
Pertinent information required by MARS was provided and Avenues Clinic in Harare was 
warned to prepare to receive a surgical case.  
The aircraft arrived at Mukumbura airstrip at 11:18 hrs and was airborne a few minutes later 
arriving in Harare at 12:06 hrs. The casualty was immediately transferred to Avenues Clinic 
where successful surgery was conducted. 
 
On Site Examination 
An on site examination headed by [the] Operations Manager and including [the QA] reps was 
conducted at 11:45hrs. 
A deminer was used to clear the 1m wide lane before the investigation team entered the 
accident area. During this recheck, 22 ploughshare fragments were found. The deminer did 
not need to excavate for these items and it is assumed they fell from the injured deminer's 
pouch during recovery. 
The area in which the accident occurred, was within the B row of the Ploughshare minefield. 
A 1m wide lane had been cleared from B3 into the first cluster, identifiable by a picket. The 
two mines, located at 2 and 5 o'clock had been found and destroyed. Both were M969. The 
deminer had continued from this cluster for a distance of approximately 15m but he did not 
find any PSF pickets to guide him. On advice from another deminer in the next lane who had 
spotted a picket in a different direction, [the victim] started a new lane and began to clear 
towards the picket just identified. 
Marking was clearly visible along the length of the 1m wide lane, excluding approximately the 
last 8m where no white pegs had been used. All that marked this last 8m stretch was the 
base stick tape. Full vegetation removal had been conducted, including approximately 1m in 
front of his base stick. 
The detector was set correctly. 
The visor was recovered forward of the base stick, almost centrally on the crater. The visor 
had received blast splatter to the face of the screen. However, the pattern radiated from the 
top of the visor outwards. 
No damage to the vest was identifiable. 
The sickle was also located beside the detector, forward of the base stick. The trowel was 
found approximately 8m back from the crater, within the 1m lane. It is assumed that this was 
in his pocket and had fallen out during the recovery from the minefield. 
The blast crater indicated that the mine was buried and was approximately 40cm in front of 
the base stick. Evidence of excavation was not noticeable. The crater was conical in shape. 
The crater was approximately 30cm in width and 5-6cm deep. This would indicate the mine 
was not deeply buried. 
 
Witness accounts and observations 
2 
The deminer was clearing a 1m wide lane at an angle of 50/60 degrees to his original axis. 
The deminer was in search of the next cluster which was not identifiable by pickets. Another 
deminer working in B4 informed [the victim] that  a picket existed to his 'north'. It is likely he 
was aiming for this point. During his clearance, the deminer had marked his areas as per 
SOP, up to 8m before the accident site. The deminer’s detector and sickle were positioned 
forward of the base stick. The vegetation had been removed for approximately 1m in front of 
the base stick. The location of the crater was forward of the base stick. 
 
Conclusions 
From the nature of the accident the following conclusion were made: 
a) The deminer, slightly disorientated by a lack of guiding pickets, had proceeded in the 
direction of pickets identified by a colleague in B4. During this process the deminer was not 
expecting a cluster in the area he stood on a mine. It is most likely that the deminer, not 
expecting a mined area/cluster, was taking shortcuts in his drills to speed up his clearance 
process. 
b) The deminer was working forward of his base stick, in breach of our laid down SOP's. 
Evident by the amount of vegetation removed forward of the base stick and the fact that his 
detector and sickle were positioned, as if placed, forward of the base stick. 
 
c) From the size and shape of the crater, the mine was quite close to the surface, buried to a 
depth of approximately 4/5cm. At this depth, all known mine types used in the Ploughshare 
are detectable with our detectors. 
d) The marking of his 1m lane, in particular, the last 8 meters, was incorrect. 
e) Immediate treatment and casevac from the minefield of the casualty was adequate. 
f) Communications proved to be adequate at the time of the accident and during the casevac 
to a level 3 establishment. 
g) The casevac system proved to be very effective on site, with the Team Leaders, 
Paramedics, and ambulance co-ordinating very well to firstly, recover the casualty from the 
safe breach and secondly, to commence ambulance transportation by road. 
h) Suspension of operations within the other 2 crews was well co-ordinated and controlled. 
 
Recommendations 
That decisive disciplinary action be taken against anyone found breaching SOPs. Dismissal is 
the punishment that would deter would be offenders. 
It would appear that this mine accident could have been avoided if the deminer had 
conducted correct clearance procedures. As a result, the following recommendations are 
made: 
a. Both manual crews conduct a minimum of 2 hours revision on the following: 
 1) the marking system 
 2) process of marking and advancing during clearance 
 3) investigation of all readings 
4) Explanations of working to a patterned minefield and the possibilities of ignoring 
readings between the pattern 
Signed: Operations Manager 





Victim number: 379 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 4 hours 15 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report  
A brief field medical report was obtained from other sources. The following reproduces its 
content verbatim. The use of *** indicates illegible handwriting. 
Details of injury: Traumatic amputation L foot (crush) 
Minor bruises ipsilateral L leg 
Field management: Pressure bandaging, benzyl penicillin 5th 1ml stat, A** 0.5 ml stat, patient 
reassurance, IVI fluids with Ringers Lactate solution, Brufen 400g inject, P**** 100g 1ml 
injects. 
Air departure (by MARS) at 11:00.  Arrival at 11:45 
Theatre time started: 12:40   Theatre time ended: 14:30 
Surgical procedure: Definitive surgical amputation L foot. 
Post operative management: Debridement of stump in August and October 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because it seems 
that the victim was working in breach of several SOPs and his errors were not corrected. The 
method of “chasing” pickets from the Ploughshare mines was questionable, and if commonly 
practiced (as seems to have been the case) makes it understandable that the victim did not 
expect danger where there was no picket.  
Despite the internal investigation deciding that the MEDEVAC had gone well, the return flight 
from Mukumbura to Harare took less than 50 minutes, yet there was a four hours and 15 
minute delay between the accident and the victim’s arrival in Harare. This implies that there 
was an unexplained delay of over two hours in either calling out the flight or the call being 
acted upon. 
4 
The blast pattern on the visor may indicate that it was upside down, so being carried. It is 
possible that the victim suffered injuries not recorded in the edited report made available by 
the demining group’s country manager.  
 The accident investigation is considered inadequate because it was censored prior to being 
made available. 
 
 
5 
